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"In legal writing, of course, it is always said that ambiguity is to be
avoided, since people's rights and duties so often arise out of language
and depend upon its meanings. But every natural language is to some
extent ambiguous. Unlike languages of mathematical logic, which are
designedfor almost no purpose but to avoid ambiguity, ordinary languages have other jobs to do ... "-Arthur Allen Leff*

I.
Who can forget the sequence in Ingmar Bergman's Winter Light1
(Bergman's own favorite among his films) where the distraught parishioner, played by Ingrid Thulin, seeks immediate intervention by the local priest (Gunnar Bjornstrand) to aid her husband whom she fears
may commit suicide. In a stunning admission, the priest reveals to Ingrid that he does not himself feel certain of God's love or even existence and can provide her husband no assurance. The husband (Max
von Sydow), whose existential panic has been touched off by reading in
a newspaper that the Chinese would soon have nuclear weapons and
thus it was "only a matter of time," drives a short distance out of town
and kills himself with a shotgun as the frigid winter afternoon turns
into night.
Is this, basically, what is happening to American legal education
today, thanks to the spread of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 2 activists
*
(1985).
1.
Winter
2.

Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment 94

YALE

L.J. 1850, 2007

See I. Bergman, Three Films by Ingmar Bergman: Through a Glass Darkly,
Light, The Silence (P. Austin, trans. 1970).
The best discussion of the genesis and early development of Critical Legal
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throughout the few remaining tenure-track teaching posts in America's
law schools? Like Bergman's priest without religion, are the CLS
professors essentially "law teachers without law" who are precipitating
the same, potentially suicidal, crisis of faith within the secular world of
legal professionalism and systematic training in the law? Is the
Harvard Law School the first victim of such self-laceration? 3 According to a growing number of law professors on American campuses, the
threat posed by CLS is not an imaginary one.
Professor Paul Carrington, Dean of the School of Law at Duke,
has been one of those most concerned about CLS. 4 In his now widelyread manifesto of the anti-CLS movement, initially delivered at the
San Francisco AALS meeting in December, 1983, Carrington argues
that the relation between law and politics has led some professors to
lose their faith in the law. Citing the use of law against the socially
powerless as one example, Carrington suggests that:
Faced with such impediments to belief in law, who can fail to
have doubts about the validity of their professionalism as lawyers?
Such disbelief threatens competence. More than a few lawyers lack
competence because they have lost, or never acquired, the needed
confidence that law matters . . . Moreover, there is dread in disbelief. A lawyer who succumbs to legal nihilism faces a far greater
danger than mere professional incompetence. He must contemplate
the dreadful reality of government by cunning and a society in
which the only right is might. Such a fright can sustain belief in
many that law is at least possible and must matter. 5

Studies, by a participant-historian, is Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of The Conference on CriticalLegal Studies, 36 STANFORD L. REV. 391 (1984).
3. See Trillin, A Reporter At Large: Harvard Law, THE NEW YORKER 53
(March 26, 1984); Margolick, "A Professor at Harvard Law Heads to West and to
Right" THE NEW YORK TIMEs 58 (Sept. 15, 1985); Margolick, "The Split at Harvard
Law Goes Down to Its Foundation" THE NEW YORK TIMEs E7 (October 6, 1985);

Gibson, "Images and Ideals in the Tenure Process" HARV. LAW RECORD 11 (October
25, 1985); Lacayo, "Critical Legal Times at Harvard" TIME 87 (Nov. 18, 1985). See
also "A Discussion On Critical Legal Studies at the Harvard Law School" (Occasional
Paper No. 1 of the Harvard Club, New York City, dated May 13, 1985).
4. See Carrington, Of Law and the River 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222-228 (1984);
"'Of Law and the River,' and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom," 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1-26 (1985); Kaplan, A Scholarly War of Words Over Academic Freedom
NAT'L LAW J. 1 (Feb. 11, 1985).
5. Carrington, supra note 4 at 227. For an assessment of the direction in which
Carrington's views were leading him prior to the publication of his critique of nihilist
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This is a dramatic analysis which can be approached from several
different, equally intriguing, angles. First, from the historical perspective (to which we shall return at greater length in Part III of this article), Carrington's comments can be usefully compared with the critique
which orthodox legal scholars directed against American Legal Realism in the period at the end of the 1930's.6 It is odd that the remarkable similarity between Carrington's critique of CLS and the orthodox
hostility to Legal Realism fifty years ago has gone almost entirely without comment from any quarter in the current debate.
Second, in spite of Carrington's obvious concern over the implications (as he sees them) of the CLS critique (which he seems to designate as simply "nihilist") 7 he does not actually engage in a historical or
empirical discussion of whether or not the critique is true. He focuses,
rather, upon the intellectual and psychological effects of our thinking it
is an accurate description of law and politics. Carrington is thus more
concerned with the implications of our "contemplating" the spectre of
"government by cunning" than with the implications of actually having
to live in a society so governed.
Nor is there any evidence for the proposition that Carrington dismisses the possibility that ours is a "government of cunning." Indeed,
how could he? Many of America's finest journalists," international legal scholars,9 novelists,10 and critical intellectuals11 spend much of their
law teachers, see Chase, Lawyer Training in the Age of the Department Store, 78 Nw.
U.L. REV. 893, 896-898 (1983).
6. See E. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).
7. Carrington, supra note 4 at 227, citing Roberto Unger, one of the most controversial figures within CLS, as well as authors of some recent work published in the
HARVARD LAW REVIEW. See Carrington,
J. LEGAL EDUC. 9, 10 (1985):

Paul D. Carrington to Robert W.Gordon 35

I am certainly aware that my concern is not appropriate with respect
to all the persons having some sympathy or connection with CLS; it is for
that reason that I tried to avoid referring to CLS as a corporate body, and
chose to comment instead on Legal Nihilism, a phrase which I thought
likely to claim [sic]for their banner, but which may nevertheless apply to
some. [Emphasis added.]

8. See, e.g., S. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE
HOUSE (1983).

9. See, e.g., F.A. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1985).
10. See, e.g., "Surrealism and Patriotism: The Education of an American Novelist ," 149 NEW LEFr REV. 95 (Jan./Feb. 1985) (Gore Vidal interviewed by Tariq Ali
and Robin Blackburn).
11. See, e.g., Chomsky, "Intervention in Vietnam and Central America: Parallels
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
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lives systematically documenting the way that the American government operates through "cunning" or deceit. The U.S. government often
relies on the rationale that within the "hardball" politics of late twentieth-century internecine competition between the Free World and the

Soviet Imperium, "might" often has to take precedence over legalistic
conceptions of "right" unless we genuinely wish to see the Russians

ruling the Rockies. 12 Americas Watch Spokesperson Aryeh Neier, who

and Differences" 37 MONTHLY REv. 1 (Sept. 1985); E.SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT,
AND THE CRITIC (1984).
12. For the record on American subordination of right to might, see Frappier,
Above the Law: Violations of InternationalLaw By the U.S. Government from Truman to Reagan, 21-22 CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1 (1984). For an important, though
disturbing, example of U.S. opposition even to minimal programs for certification of
legal recognition of human rights, see comments by former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights, Elliott Abrams, in ABC NEWS NIGHTLINE SHOW #670 (Dec.
2, 1983) at 9:
That certification asked all the wrong questions. Mr. Ford [brother of
American nun slain in El Salvador by government troops] himself just
asked a few wrong questions and left out some important ones like, what's
human rights in El Salvador going to be like if the guerrillas win because
we cut off our aid? Is that the future we want for El Salvador - no election ever? A Communist government to take over El Salvador? That's the
kind of question that is not asked in the certification.
Indeed that question is not asked either in certification or in law. In the most
general terms, the question for the lawyer or judge is this: Does the governmental
conduct in question conform to the requirements of domestic and international law? On
the other hand, for politicians like Kissinger, Reagan, and Abrams, the question frequently is: How will this effect the relative strength of Communist forces in the area?
Thus, our government resorts to tortured distinctions between "totalitarian" (communist) and merely "authoritarian" (fascist) governments. Thus is right subordinated to
might, law manipulated in behalf of a politics of cunning. See, e.g., J. MCMAHAN,
REAGAN AND THE WORLD: IMPERIAL POLICY IN THE NEW COLD WAR (1985).
On the generation of public fear that the Russians will eventually invade the
United States, see the recent motion picture RED DAWN (1984); cf., "Details At I1

O'Clock"

THE NATION

361 (Oct. 19, 1985):

[A]BC is now shooting a kind of antidote to [The Day After].
'AMERIKA', a $40 million, sixteen-hour miniseries, is supposed to stick it
to the nuclear crybabies who think it's better to be Red than dead. It will
docudramatize a bombless, bloodless Soviet takeover of America, by unspecified means, and show Americans what it is like to live under a totalitarian regime.
Thus ABC's entertainment division, exploiting an anti-Russian sentiment already
explicitly if innocuously deployed in professional wrestling and installments of the film,
Rocky, will attempt to accomplish the same sort of task (bringing home the fear of
communism) pursued by Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, as described
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is surely as committed as Paul Carrington to holding legal rights superior to political conflicts and is widely respected for his devotion to the
"rule of law" values defended by the American Civil Liberties Union, 3
is compelled to report that in today's world:
The Reagan Administration holds law, and particularly international law, in low regard, as it has demonstrated on a number of
occasions, from its objection to U.S. ratification of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention to its effort to sabotage the World
Court. Nowhere has this been more evident
than in the way the
4
White House has dealt with terrorism.
Obviously, "sabotaging the World Court" when international law
might obstruct our military and economic foreign policy 15 is precisely
what Carrington must mean by governmental cunning and subordination of law to politics. Thus the world which frightens him, the one
whose very "contemplation" Carrington warns law teachers against, is
already upon us. The sort of contemplation which understandably fills
the Dean of Duke's School of Law with "dread" forms part of what
most Americans have to face each morning on their "toasters with pictures"'1 6 (televisions) when they get up and make breakfast. That Carabove, on ABC's "news program", Nightline.
13. For Neier's clear and convincing defense of his position on "American Nazis,
the Skokie Case, and the risks of freedom", see A. NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY

(1979).
14. Neier, Rules of Law THE NATION 398 (October 26, 1985); see also Neier,
The U.S. and The Contras, 33 N.Y. REv. BOOKS 3 (April 10, 1986).
15. See, e.g., W.A. WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1966),
H. MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMICS OF US. FOREIGN POLICY

(1969); TRILATERALISM: THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION AND ELITE PLANNING FOR
WORLD MANAGEMENT (H. Sklar, ed. 1980); J. KOLKO & G. KOLKO, THE LIMITS OF
POWER: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954 (1972) and 33

RADICAL HISTORY REV. 3-164 (Sept., 1985) (special issue on "The American
Empire").
16. See Nossiter, "The F.C.C.'s Big Giveaway Show" THE NATION 402, 402

(Oct. 26, 1985):

The [F.C.C.'s] engaging chair, Mark S. Fowler, is a former lawyer
for broadcasters who can expect to resume this lucrative practice when he

leaves government. In a recent address to radio and television executives in
New York City, Fowler described his revolution with disarming candor:

"It was time to move away from thinking about broadcasters as trustees. It
was time to treat them the way almost everyone else in society does that is, as businesses." After all, he said on another occasion, "television is
just another appliance. It's a toaster with pictures."
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
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rington is able to lament the critique of law's subordination to politics
while avoiding acknowledgment of the critique's sad application to the
way the world has rapidly become, remains one of the great mysteries
of his article.
Third, there is an uncanny similarity between Carrington's plea
for courage in the face of dreaded unbelief and the crisis of religious
faith represented by the priest's apostasy in Bergman's Winter Light. It
is almost as if Carrington regarded belief in law as a kind of residue of
the spirit which once provided such a warm glow to the candle of religious faith - almost as if, for Carrington, the values of the rule of law
are propped up (like those of religion) by nothing more substantial
than a tissue-paper-thin leap into the dark and that our fragile faith in
the law itself could be swept away as one cynic after another rapidly
succumbs to a seemingly irresistible heresy: belief that law is a hoax.
Can totalitarianism of one form or another be far behind such a collapse? "Teaching cynicism may," at any rate, argues Carrington, "and
perhaps probably does, result in the learning of the skills of corruption:
bribery and intimidation." 1 What, according to Carrington, is the appropriate remedy? "[T]he nihilist who must profess that legal principle
does not matter has an ethical duty to depart the law school, perhaps to
seek a place elsewhere in the academy." 18
It apparently did not occur to Carrington that his suggestion some
CLS professors should not be in legal education would strike a few
professors at national law schools as a potential threat to academic
freedom and the intellectual independence of American law teachers.'"
Even after the development of sharp criticism of Carrington's commentary regarding limits to what a law teacher should be allowed to believe, 20 the Dean wrote to readers of the Duke Law Magazine: "I hope

17.

Carrington, supra note 4 at 227.

18.

Id.

19. See Kaplan, supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., from the journal of the American Association of University Professors, Finkin, "Report of Committee A, 1984-85" ACADEME 8a, 13a (Sept. - Oct.
1985):

The committee received an inquiry from Professor Paul Brest of the
School of Law, Stanford University, concerning an article by Dean Paul
Carrington of the Duke Law School dealing with the 'critical legal studies'
movement in legal education. Professor Brest inquired as to the Association's position on issues of academic freedom raised by a seeming predisposition against the appointment of law professors who espouse what Dean
Carrington termed 'nihilistic' views ...

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss2/8

We hope to produce a statement

6

Chase: What Should a Law Teacher Believe?

1986]

Anthony Chase

409

you will agree that my words did no harm save that perhaps of uttering
an unwelcome truth."'" Carrington's placement of the consequences of
his conduct in the past (i.e., "did no harm") is not the only aspect of
the Dean's judgment that is now being questioned. 2
II.
Before returning to a historical perspective on the relation between
anti-CLS critique in the 1980's and anti-Legal Realism prior to the
Second World War, it may be helpful to take a brief look at what
CLS, the object of Carrington's concern, is all about.
Though the fact is not often enough acknowledged, there are at
least four approaches to or versions of CLS. First, CLS has been holding national meetings for about seven years in cities such as Boston,
Madison, Minneapolis, Camden, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.
In a sense, the best description of CLS is simply the values and views
of all the lawyers, law students, law professors, social scientists, and
other interested parties, who have come together for these national
meetings and everything which has come out of that mutual association
and activity.2 3 Virtually no one ever tries to talk about CLS in these
terms and that is a pity.
A second version of "what CLS stands for" can be based upon the
material included in "A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies" published by the Yale Law Journalin 1984.24 Such a reading (and it be-

that will at least explain the difficulties in the question and will not be
entirely platitudinous.
On other efforts to limit the views of university teachers, see Benjamin, "On 'Accuracy in Academia' and American Freedom" ACADEME la (Sept. - Oct., 1985); R.
HOFSTADTER & W.

METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE
HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER

UNITED STATES

(1955); R.

(1963); R.
ESSAYS (1965); A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 206-225 (1982).
21. Carrington, Author's Preface DUKE LAW MAGAZINE (Extra, Feb., 1985).
22. See, e.g., Gordon, Robert W. Gordon to Paul D. Carrington 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 13 (1985); Finman, Critical Legal Studies, Professionalism, and Academic
Freedom: Exploring the Tributariesof Carrington'sRiver, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 180
(1985); and Gary Minda's article, herein at 705.
23. There is no history or even summary of these meetings in existence, to my
knowledge, yet (again) Schlegel's comments are illuminating. See Schlegel, supra note
2.
24. Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies 94 YALE L.J.
461-490 (1984).

Published by NSUWorks, 1986
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comes in this approach just that, a reading of CLS) eliminates the values and perspectives of those who do not publish books or articles yet
have participated in the experience (or "happening" in Edward
Thompson's reference) 25 of CLS as a form of social praxis. Even this
truncated version of CLS, however, is virtually never what writers have
in mind when they refer to "what CLS says" about this or that.
Next, there are third and fourth versions of CLS which involve a
paring down of the massive CLS bibliography (as of 1984) into just
forty or fifty "key works" and then cataloguing those between one of
two categories to which I refer as CLS3 and CLS4.26
CLS3 represents, more or less, legal education's (belated) version
of American left academia. Although the Accuracy in Academia estimate that there are 10,000 Marxist college and university professors in
America 7 is, I imagine, outrageously high, there are Marxist, socialist,
anarchist, radical feminist or otherwise left-wing teachers and scholars
in most university disciplines in the United States today.2 8 The "work"
of CLS3 stands in direct relation to the scholarship produced by other
American left-wing professors, particularly those in such fields as sociology, history, and political science. Premier examples of CLS3 scholars include Richard Abel at UCLA, Morton Horwitz at Harvard, and
David Trubek at Wisconsin.29 CLS3 writing also has an important and
interesting relation to the work of legal historians and sociologists not
involved with CLS, such as Lawrence Friedman at Stanford, Willard
Hurst at Wisconsin, and Stanley Katz at Princeton.30 Stated in the

25. See E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 9-14
(1966).
26. For an earlier effort to identify and distinguish two leading tendencies within
CLS, see Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 563 n.

1 (1983).
27. See Benjamin, supra note 20.
28. See, e.g., B. OLLMAN & E. VERNOFF, THE LEFT ACADEMY: MARXIST SCHOLARSHIP ON AMERICAN CAMPUSES (1982).
29. Although Abel and Trubek, for example, can be regarded as empirical sociologists, the split between "empirical" and "theoretical" work is not at all what I have
in mind when distinguishing CLS3 from CLS4. The sort of work characterized here as
CLS3 shares with the work of other left academicians both an empirical and a theoretical capacity.
30. For brief but representative recent examples of each author's general approach to legal history or sociology, see Friedman, American Legal History: Past and
Present, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 563 (1984); Hurst, Response, 1985 AM.BAR FOUND. RES.
J. 138 (1985); Katz, "An Historical Perspective on Crises in Civil Liberties" OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS: THE ACLU REPORT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES TODAY 311 (N. Dorsen,
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simplest possible way, CLS3 is engaged in the analysis of historical,
political, and socio-economic causes and consequences of the operation
of the American legal system, broadly understood. It is rarely, however,
CLS3 research perspectives which are referred to when people (both in

and out of CLS generally) talk about "the CLS argument."
CLS4, however, from closed meetings of tenured faculty to the

pages of Time magazine, is precisely at the heart of things whenever
CLS as a whole is supposed to be under discussion. Rejecting "evolu-

tionary functionalist" explanations (whether of Marxian or liberal origin), CLS4 asserts that the primary (or even exclusive) importance of

law derives from its "superstructural" role in society. Or if one rejects
the "base/superstructure" nomenclature itself - which seems inevitably to end up artificially separating "ideas" from "forces of production" - it can be argued that what is unique about CLS4 is its emphasis upon the significance of law as a form of "ideology," as a means of
providing "legitimation" for the way things already are. The law-asideology approach sees the mental structure of legal reasoning as a

framework within which individuals come to know and understand
themselves and their world."1
This conclusion by CLS4 is derived from two essential analyses, to
which I refer as the critique of indeterminacy and the critique of pervasiveness. First, the critique of indeterminacy is what we normally conceive to be the cutting edge or "avant-garde moment" of American
Legal Realism:3 2 the assertion that law is not, like the mountain, there

ed. 1984).
31. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 30 at 571:
If there is one single idea that underlies the Critical school, or the
intellectual historians, or the neodoctrinalists, it is that law matters in society, and matters a great deal. The new legal historians are sure that law is
significant, because it provides a legitimating myth for society. The key
element of law is not what it actually does, but what it means. What could
be more important, more fundamental, than a legitimating myth? Ideologies provide meaning for the lives people live; they are pillars that buttress
social structure and hold society in place. A cynic might point out that this
approach has the virtue of legitimating, not the legal system, not capitalism or socialism, but the practice of sitting in a law library reading appellate cases and legal treatises.
For recent examples of the law-as-ideology approach, see the comments of Duncan
Kennedy in A Discussion on CriticalLegal Studies, supra note 3; Cornell, Toward a
Modern/PostmodernReconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); Peller,
The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985).
32. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
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law is an open-textured and infinitely "ma-

nipulable" system (at least at the level of language and the understood
meanings of words) whereby virtually any judicial result can be "logically justified" on any given set of facts.33 Thus law cannot be explained simply in terms of reasoning from precedent or stare decisis or
logical analysis of statutory or common law rules. Rather than constituting some sort of revolutionary philosophy, however, this critique (in
and of itself) frequently amounts to little more than the argument for
inclusion of "and materials" in the titles of West or Foundation
casebooks published since the Second World War.
At some prestige law schools (though not, apparently, Dean Carrington's) Legal Realist skepticism has become the dominant emphasis
within parts of the first-year curriculum. The degree to which a law
school relies upon such an assiduous approach to teaching first-year
subjects (or upon the class assignment of such supplementary texts in
the first-year as Grant Gilmore's "nihilist" works 4) is probably one of
the best indexes of where a particular school ranks in the national law
school "pecking order."3 5 One way of interpreting Paul Carrington's
critique of "nihilism" in law teaching would, in fact, suggest that he is
mounting a challenge to the current "top ten" law schools in the
United States (according to contemporary orthodoxy) and proposing alternative criteria (e.g. the absence of CLS teachers) for determining
exactly which schools should be ranked at the apex of national
hierarchy.
It is the second aspect of CLS4, however, referred to here as the
critique of pervasiveness, which carries this version of CLS beyond Legal Realism. On the one hand, the critique of indeterminacy unlocks
how the mechanics of liberal legalism work: results which are, in fact,
politically contingent - inevitably dependent upon circumstances (and
not just 'economic' ones, of course) outside of legal reasoning - are
made to seem above politics (the identities of the contending parties or
interests, the relative power of particular lawyers, judges, legislative
lobbies, the 'larger' social tensions and conflicts of the day) and thus
appear reasonably neutral. On the other hand, the critique of pervasive33. For a good, recent statement of this position, see Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
34. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); G. GILMORE, THE
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).

35. Compare, address by Duncan Kennedy to the 29th National Conference of
Law Reviews (March 24, 1983).
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss2/8
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ness unlocks why liberal legalism is important, why it is significant that
the process works the way it does: "By inducing us to believe that existing institutions and patterns of social thought are natural, rational,
or necessary, legal discourse inhibits our ability to perceive the contingency of present arrangements - the extent to which they are created
and sustained by human choice." 3 6
Thus the how of liberal legalism's self-effacement added to its why
its naturalization of social institutions throughout a society which
identifies itself (at least within CLS4 theory) as legitimated through
the rule of law - equals the target of CLS4 critique: the ideology of
liberal legalism and of the American legal system. As Bill Nichols suggests in a different but parallel context:
All human activity that involves communication and exchange,
whether it is the economic production of an automobile or the artistic production of a painting, produces meaning. The elements of
this production that represent the needs of the dominant class order
are ideological elements. We need to be able to identify these ideological elements, to discover the aspects of representation that embody them, to understand the place set out for us within such
processes. One crucial aspect of this place is that it proposes a way
of seeing invested with meanings that naturalize themselves as
timeless, objective, obvious. What remains hidden is the process of
representation itself, the investment of meanings as a material social process. Ideology appears to produce not itself, but the world.
It proposes obviousness, a sense of 'the way things are,' within
which our sense
of place and self emerges as an equally self-evident
7
proposition.1
I haved quoted Nichols here at some length since his observations
seem to explicate the CLS4 critique: in the determinate or Classical3
game plan (serving the dominant order), liberal legalism presents a
world where law produces not itself but, rather, appears to produce the
world. That is what ideology, according to CLS4 (and much recent
Marxist theory, incidently)3" is all about.
36. Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal
PoliticalImagination, 97 HARV. L. REV. 475, 475-476 (1983).
37. B. NICHOLS, IDEOLOGY AND THE IMAGE 2 (1981).
38. See Mench, "The History of Mainstream Legal Thought" THE POLITICS OF
LAW 18 (D. Kairys, ed. 1982).
39. See, e.g., L. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" LENIN
AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (1970). For a general discussion of legal or
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
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I find it hard to disagree with the first component of CLS4 - the
critique of indeterminacy; neither would many of the original Legal
Realists in their best, most iconoclastic, moments. But I question the
second component or prong of the CLS4 analysis: the critique of pervasiveness.4 0 In his essay herein, Harvard Professor Duncan Kennedy argues persuasively (it seems to me) in defense of one conception of pervasiveness., 1 He suggests that for radical law teachers there is a severe
price to pay for abandoning the "real system" or "the basic, the hard
curriculum" to those who would teach these courses from a Classical or
"Willistonian" perspective while "left-liberal types" gravitate toward
the seemingly more "value oriented" courses such as Constitutional
Law, Civil Rights and Liberties, or Poverty Law (is this course still
taught?). The latter variety of "soft" course (in terms of student perception) remains important, asserts Kennedy, but it is more significant
for CLS4 professors to meet the challenge of the "hard/soft model" by
demonstrating systematically the parallel "indeterminacy" of "hard or
'black letter' " courses, such as Property, Contracts, Torts, substantive
Criminal Law, Corporations and Tax. 42
Indeed, I cannot imagine a "critique of indeterminacy" worth its
salt which could not demonstrate the inherent, "across the board" ambiguity of legal language, irrespective of the particular field of law
which happens to be covered by a specific case or statute. Indeterminacy is built into the law as a structure just as the unconscious is built
into human mental life as a structure; these are not introduced from
the "outside" (by the "Realist" law professor in the first instance, by
the psychoanalyst, for example, in the second) 43 but rather are conother ideologies, some of it sharply critical of recent exaggeration of the importance of
ideology in determining social development or change, see LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND
THE STATE (D. Sugarman, ed. 1983); C. SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARXIST THEORY OF IDEOLOGY AND LAW (1979); J. MCCARNEY,
THE REAL WORLD OF IDEOLOGY (1980); P. HIRST, ON LAW AND IDEOLOGY (1979); G.
THERBORN, THE IDEOLOGY OF POWER AND THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY (1980); N. ABERCROMBIE,

S.

HILL, AND

B.

TURNER, THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY THESIS

(1980); M.

CAIN & A. HUNT, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW (1979). By far, the briefest and most
persuasive contribution to this debate is J.G. MERQUIOR, THE VEIL AND THE MASK:

(1979).
40. For extended discussion of this point of disagreement, see Chase, Toward a
(1985).
Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 41. Kennedy, Liberal Values in Legal Education, 10 NOVA L.J. 603 (1986).
42. Id. at 611.
43. See Chase, Jerome Frank and American Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence, 2
INT'L J. OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 29, 31-37 (1979).
ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY
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stituitive of the structures in question themselves. 4 Kennedy is right to
argue that it is precisely in the universe of the apparently iron-clad,
common sense/common law first-year curriculum where the Legal Realist critique must be refought, year in and year out, if it is to succeed.
But there is all the difference in the world between successfully
demonstrating that indeterminacy is pervasive throughout the law
school curriculum (as Kennedy does) and demonstrating that the ideological consequences of the gambit which the critique of indeterminacy
seeks to reveal are pervasive throughoutAmerican social life. One cannot even try to argue, in fact, that the ideology of "liberal legalism" or
of the American law school has managed to permeate the consciousness
of different social classes or groups in the United States and thus has
changed American politics and history, without abandoning the American law school library altogether and engaging in the kind of sociological, historical, or anthropological research which is sometimes attempted within CLS3 and is commonly the center of American left
academic scholarship.
Rather than questioning the centrality of legal ideology in social
history, however, CLS's conservative critics have confined themselves to
an attack on the first prong or component of CLS4 analysis: the critique of indeterminacy which directly relates CLS4, as even its champions usually acknowledge, to the American Legal Realist movement.
Here, then, it is useful to return to our promised sketch of the relation
between anti-Legal Realism and contemporary hostility to CLS.
C

"What should a law-teacher believe?"
44. See Singer, supra note 33.
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III.
Current opponents of CLS often profess an at least "arm's length"
appreciation of or respect for the critical analysis of law generated by
American Legal Realists during the period between the two great
world wars. But the comparison I wish to draw is between the current
hostility to CLS and the specific opposition with which Legal Realism
was confronted during the rise of totalitarian governments in the
1930's. Like so many other iconoclastic or modernist movements of this
century, Legal Realism has become a great deal more acceptable to the
orthodox after its initial challenge has been absorbed and/or
deflected.45
Paul Carrington, in his critique of CLS, indicates that "[t]he professionalism and intellectual courage of lawyers does not require rejection of Legal Realism and its lesson that who decides also matters.
What it cannot abide is the embrace of nihilism and its lesson that who
decides is everything, and principle nothing but cosmetic." 4 The distinction deployed here by Carrington to "save" Legal Realism from
being subject to his critique of nihilism - the effort to distinguish between who decides matters/who decides is everything - turns out, in
my view, to be a hopeless contrivance when actually applied to specific
Legal Realist and CLS doctrinal analyses. Not only is it impossible to
determine whether some sliding scale of percentage cosmetic reveals
Jerome Frank or Karl Llewellyn or Thurman Arnold to be 96% skeptical of a particular appellate judicial rationale for a legal decision (as
opposed to the presumed CLS score of full "tens" from all three
judges!) but, further, simple common sense tells us that if the opinion
for the court had been written by one of the dissenters instead of one of
the majority (indicating the balance had shifted the other way in a
particular judicial appeal) then who decided was (in a sense) "everything". To provide another example, consider the opinion of Realistfellow traveller, Benjamin N. Cardozo, in the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.47 In justifying the result which he reached in
MacPherson (defendant motor company liable for negligent failure to
inspect for safety prior to sale), was Cardozo's dramatic extention of
45.

Of course Legal Realism has never been accepted as the general organizing

theory for either mainstream legal education or legal scholarship in the United States.
For a much fuller discussion, see Chase, American Legal Education Since 1885: The
Case of the Missing Modern, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 519 (1985).
46. Carrington, supra note 4 at 227.
47. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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"the principle of Thomas v. Winchester" nothing but cosmetic (as Carrington would have it), thus moving him into Carrington's "nihilist"
category? Or was Cardozo's manipulation of the earlier legal principle
only 9/10's cosmetic? Is that even a distinction worth trying to make?
Is my attempt here to, perhaps, obscure the distinction between two
different meanings of the word "principle" (the way Carrington meant
it and the way Cardozo used it in MacPherson) itself a form of "cosmetics"? Am I therefore a "nihilist"? What, precisely, is the difference
between Carrington's "nihilism" and Francis Wellman's "art of advocacy"? 48 If there is no significant difference between the central argument of Legal Realism, the first prong of CLS4 critique, and the essential dynamic of an adversary judicial system, then are not all legal
professionals likely to end up branded as "nihilists" within Carrington's
49
system of thought?
I have suggested, however, that there seems to me to be an even
more fundamental argument which can be made with regard to contemporary anti-CLS posture, an argument which links it to the antiLegal Realist critique advanced during the latter part of the 1930's.
Historian Edward Purcell has written of the increasingly bitter reception Realism received as the Second World War loomed:
In the context of the late thirties the logical implications of
realism, morally and politically, seemed too apparaent and too
frightening. Much of its work had slighted the importance of ethical theory. Its philosophical assumptions had undermined the concept of a rationally knowable moral standard. Its apparent ethical
relativism seemed to mean that no Nazi barbarity could be justly
branded as an evil, while its identification of law with the actions of
government officials gave even the most offensive Nazi edict the
sanction of true law. Juxtaposing that logic to the actions of the
totalitarian states, the critics painted realism in the most ominous
and shocking colors. 50
48. F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS EXAMINATION (1903).
49. There is an interesting parallel between the hostility to CLS within the academy and hostility to zealous advocacy by the defense bar in criminal cases. In both
instances, the targets of criticism are assailed for having gone as far as possible (within
the rules) toward revealing the "open texture" of legal language and legal process. See,
e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). And in both
instances, it is almost a regime of proper etiquette or inarticulate but consensual norms
of decency which are allegedly transgressed.
50. Purcell, supra note 6 at 172; ef., J.P. DIGGINS, MUSSOLINI AND FASCISM: THE
VIEW FROM AMERICA (1972) (a far superior historical account but which does not
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Purcell's deft presentation of the anti-Legal Realist mood which
developed as the War approached is equalled only by his curious unwillingness or inability to respond to the kind of critique which was
launched against the fatal vulnerability to totalitarian misuse to which
Realism, according to its critics, had lent itself. Moreover, this attack
upon Legal Realism is one to which I have found many contemporary
law professors unable to respond other than in terms such as, "any system of ideas can be used by the wrong people," etcetera.
Thus, to the extent that a distrust of the political implications of
contemporary CLS inconoclasm can be seen as analogous to the fear of
Legal Realist "moral relativism" of the 1930's, the current critics of
CLS as a potentially dangerous intellectual force seem to me to have a
strategic argument against CLS which may appeal to both liberal and
51
conservative law professors.
It is also an argument which I think can be readily smashed. First,
we might ask if there are any direct links between the work of the
American Legal Realists and right-wing or authoritarian political developments subsequent to Realism's impact on American law and jurisprudence. No one, to my knowledge, has argued that specific fascist or
Nazi leaders during the 1930's or 1940's were familiar with or utilized
in their political theories the work of American Legal Realists. Nor, to
my knowledge, has anyone argued that, within the American political
context, leaders such as President Richard Nixon or Henry Kissinger
have relied upon the Realist critique of indeterminacy in law to justify
their conduct in violation of law, whether we are referring to domestic
espionage and neglect of civil rights and liberties, the Watergate conspiracy, the overthrow of democratically-elected leaders of foreign
consider the reaction to American Legal Realism).
51. It is relatively easy to juxtapose quotations from Paul Carrington's critique
of CLS, for example, with references from 1930's critique of Legal Realism. See, e.g.,
Purcell, supra note 6 at 159-160:
The forerunners - scholars such as Holmes, Pound, and John Chipman Gray had always had their critics, but they had seemed to represent an ever-strengthening
force in an old and slowly changing discipline. .. [.] By the late thirties criticism
turned into a direct frontal assault on realism as a form of skepticism, nihilism, and
moral relativism that was helping to destroy American civilization.
In a sense, the transformation of CLS's institutional reception has duplicated that
of Legal Realism but in less than half the time. See A Discussion on Critical Legal
Studies, supra note 3; A Symposium on Legal Culture: Legal Education and the
Spirit of Contemporary American Law, 8 HARV. J. LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 225-358
(1985); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1-674 (1984).
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countries, or the illegal bombing of Cambodia which cost thousands of
human lives. Just as President Nixon probably had little familiarity
with the work of Karl Llewellyn and presumably was not persuaded to
authorize payment of funds to silence Watergate conspirators by certain passages in the Uniform Commercial Code (one of Realism's
greatest "achievements"), President Ronald Reagan probably did not
have recourse to the works of Roberto Unger or Duncan Kennedy in
deciding to invade Grenada, back Central American anti-communist
"contras", pull out of World Court jurisdiction, or approve Central Intelligence Agency terrorist activity.
Thus, there would appear to be, in retrospect, little direct evidence
for the 1930's contention that promotion of an "indeterminacy critique" of judicial reasoning somehow led to the rise of Nazi and fascist,
right-wing or neoconservative political regimes.
Second, Purcell observes that Realism's "apparent ethical relativism seemed to mean that no Nazi barbarity could be justly branded as
an evil. .. -52 Again, this seems to me an argument which can easily
be defeated. Significantly, it was responded to at the time andfrom the
left. In his great work on the rise of the Nazi social, economic, and
legal system, Franz Neumann 53 observed that "[i]f we agree with a
recent American work that holds [wiping out the boundary between
ethics and law] to be progress, then we can refute the National Socialists in political or ethical terms, not in terms of law.""
For Neumann, a socialist, the idea that one's moral, ethical, and
political stance in the world could be collapsed into any sort of exclusive reliance upon legal philosophy was absurd. One could oppose fascism from the left not because it violated some particular canon of legalism but, rather, because it was fascist.5 To be sure, this

52. See supra note 55.
53.

F. NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SO1933-1944 (1944 ed., repr. 1983); See also Chase, The Left on Rights: An
Introduction, 62 TEXAS L.REv. 1541 (1984) (discussing Neumann's contribution to
American political thought); and Chase, Book Review, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 304 (1984).
54. F. NEUMANN, supra note 53 at 153 [emphasis added]. It is amazing that this
point of view seems invisible to Purcell, supra note 6, and that Purcell thus fails to
frame his book in terms of why so many American law professors appear to have ridiculously overestimated the capacity of law, standing alone, to prevent the rise of fascism
or anything else.
55. For arguments why one should oppose fascism, irrespective of one's personal
jurisprudential preference, see, e.g., F. NEUMANN, supra note 53; R. PALME DUTT, FASCISM AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION (1934); D. GUERIN, FASCISM AND BIG BUSINESS (1936);
CIALISM
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circumstance may present a certain perplexity for those not on the left

who, stripped of their jurisprudential position, may be without any
56
clear answer why a capitalist should oppose fascism.
I realize that many CLS supporters today have responded, like
some Legal Realists of the past, to assertions that they are "moral relativists" or "nihilists" by arguing that, on the contrary, they have strong

moral values which are not undercut in their view by recognition of the
"indeterminacy critique" (prong one, it will be recalled, of CLS4 analysis) 57 and that they hardly perceive their work as somehow making
the American legal system increasingly vulnerable to right-wing or neoconservative demagogic appeals. I am sure that, in many cases, this
reflects the most appropriate and honest response to the growing hostil-

ity directed toward CLS.
Yet there seems to me to be great value in following the approach
of Nation magazine journalist Alex Cockburn: that is, contest the op-

N. POULANTZAS, FASCISM AND DICTATORSHIP (1974); M. VAJDA, FASCISM AS A MASS
MOVEMENT (1976); J. BORKIN, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN (1978);
A. GRAMSCI, LETTERS FROM PRISON (L. Lawner, trans. 1975).

56.

See, e.g., J. BORKIN, supra note 55 at 139-140:
By the time the prosecution of the I.G. officials began in 1947, a new

element had been added to the objections of war crimes trials. The cold
war had begun. Germany, the wartime enemy, had become a sought after
ally; the U.S.S.R., the former ally, was now regarded as the enemy. Congressman John E. Rankin of Mississippi declared on the floor of the House
of Representatives: "What is taking place in Nuremberg, Germany, is a
disgrace to the United States. Every other country now has washed its
hands and withdrawn from the saturnalia of persecution. But a racial minority, two and a half years after the war closed, are in Nuremberg not
only hanging German soldiers but trying German businessmen in the name
of the United States."
See also L. GOLDMANN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 28-29 (1973):
It must be constantly stressed that the fundamental moral neutrality
of the individualist approach refers only to values of content, to relations of
love, hate or indifference to others. In contrast to these are the formal
values already listed - freedom, equality, toleration - and the concept of
justice, which, as will be seen, is closely linked with them. In history these
are intimately bound up with individualism, and, so long as they can be
realized without difficulty, still retain their dominant position in western
capitalist society. But, just because individualism in the last resort is morally neutral, there is always the danger that in a serious crisis they may be
displaced by the opposite values. National Socialism in Germany was the
greatest and most frightening instance of this, but unfortunately not the
only one.
57. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
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position in terms of their most basic conceptions of the terrain of debate. In other words, what exactly is wrong with a person (including a
law professor) being a nihilist if he or she wishes to be? Where, for
example, is the evidence that even naked nihilist values lead to the rise
of fascist social movements?
One way of briefly approaching this issue is to observe the way the
"David Abraham affair"58 has helped sort out two basic views or positions with respect to the origins of German Nazism and, to a lesser
degree, other European varieties of fascism. On the one hand, we can
identify those theorists who characterize Nazi Germany as a specific
form of and moment within the development of European capitalism
during the first half of the twentieth-century. Summarizing Abraham's
thesis itself, Richard Evans writes that:
[T]he bourgeoisie, weakened and divided by the Weimar Republic and confronted by a strongly organized working class, was
plunged into a deep crisis by the Depression. Fascism, as a result,
came to power not just because of the struggle between labour and
capital, nor because of any kind of equilibrium between the two,
but also because of 'the inability of fragmented dominant groups to
organize and unify their interests'.

.

. The only way for industrial-

ists and landed estate owners to protect their social dominance in
these circumstances was to join forces to bring an end to the Weimar Republic. In this way, the political system could be reshaped
to remove the political impediments to class unity and destroy the
obstacle59 that organized labour posed to the accumulation of
capital.
On the other hand, we can identify those theorists who reject such
"Marxist" or "materialist" emphasis and whose "revision" of the initial, post-War scholarly view produced a new generation (including
David Abraham) of "counter-revisionist" scholars on the left. Prior to
the recent outbreak of this intellectual "civil war" between revisionists
(eclectic) and counter-revisionists (neo-Marxist), one of the most
widely respected historians of fascism, Stanley Payne of the University
of Wisconsin, seemed to come down on the side of one of David Abraham's current adversaries - at least on the issue of the role played by
58. See, e.g., The David Abraham Case: Ten Comments From Historians, 32
75-96 (1985).
59. Evans, The Myth of Germany's Missing Revolution, 149 NEw LEFT REv.
67, 92 (Jan./Feb. 1985).
RADICAL HISTORY REV.
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finance capital in the rise of Nazism: "[Henry] Turner is evidently correct that the right authoritarians, not the Nazis, were the main party of
big business, and the counter-revisionists have failed to prove that big

business 'bought' Hitler .. ."o Given Payne's apparent location on
the "right" or "anti-vulgar Marxist" side of this fault line running

through contemporary fascist historiography, and with specific relation
to the current hostility to the "indeterminacy critique" in legal studies

and its "nihilist" overtones, it is fascinating to record this observation
by Payne:
The Hitler regime was so bewildering in its methods and goals
that interpretation has frequently given up altogether and fallen
back on sheer negatives for understanding - the 'revolution of nihilism' or the overriding motiviation of 'antimodernism'. Hitler and
his crew, however repellent, were not nihilists but held tenaciously
to firm and evil values. Nihilism is more nearly what came after
Hitler, unless sheer hedonism is considered a value rather than
the absence of values.61
One wonders if those current guardians of the integrity of Ameri-

can legal education who feel so strongly about "nihilists" on law school
faculties need to be told precisely what Payne means by nihilism, what
he means by the phrase, "what came after Hitler". What came after

Hitler, of course, was the world of Adenauer's capitalist, "hedonist",
American-sponsored "economic miracle", the desultory consumer soci60. S. PAYNE, FASCISM: COMPARISON AND DEFINITION 58 (1980).
61. Id. at 96 [emphasis added]. For the Italian case, see id. at 183.
[A.] James Gregor in his The Ideology of Fascism . . .argues that
Italian Fascism developed a coherent ideology that was not the product of
nihilistic collapse but rather the consequence of specific new cultural, political, and sociological ideas developed in western and central Europe during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Payne adds that:
Eugene Weber suggested that fascism was a unique and specific revolutionary project in its own right, while George Mosse, the leading historian of Nazi and pre-Nazi culture, interprets fascism as a revolution of the
right with transcendental goals of its own and specific, not merely reactive
or opportunistic, cultural and ideological content.
Id. at 183-184.
How many law professors, including those who have waded into the debate over
"nihilism" in legal education, have even heard of Payne, Weber, Mosse, the wonderful
scholar Richard Hamilton, or any of the other premier American historians and sociologists of Nazi or Fascist culture and society?

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss2/8

20

19861

Chase: What Should a Law Teacher Believe?

Anthony Chase

ety of glass shopping malls and Autobahn pictured in boring instructional films I viewed in German language classes in the 1960's (complete with grotesque muzak sound-track apparently designed to
encourage us to mark down Berlin on our world shopping list). It is
precisely the directionlessness of this post-War German culture 2 which
has been savaged by artists like Heinrich B611, Peter Handke, and
Rainer Werner Fassbinder, whose film, The Marriage of Maria
Braun,6 3 like Reagan's homage to Bitburg,6 4 reveals with great clarity
the true implications of Paul Carrington's misreading of the socio-economic conditions of nihilist culture.

IV.
On the first of June, 1927, as part of an exchange which included
discussion of the relative merits of socialism, Mr. Justice Holmes wrote
his friend and correspondent, Fabian socialist Harold J. Laski, the
following:
You put well a philosophic rather than economic difference between us. I do accept 'a rough equation between isness and oughtness,' or rather I don't know anything about oughtness except
Cromwell's - a few poor gentlemen have put their lives upon it.
You respect the rights of man - I don't, except those things a
given crowd will fight for - which vary from religion to the price
of a glass of beer. I also would fight for some things - but instead
of saying that they ought to be I merely say they are part of the
kind of world that I like - or should like. You put your ideals or
prophecies with the slight superior smile of the man who is sure
62. See OBSERVATIONS ON 'THE SPIRITUAL SITUATION OF THE AGE' (J.
Habermas, ed. 1984); and Special Issue on Heimat, 36 NEw GERMAN CRITIQUE (Fall
1985).
63. See R. HAYMAN, FASSBINDER: FILM MAKER 116-119 (1984). See also P.
IDEN, FASSBINDER (R. McCormick, trans. 1981).
64. See Cockburn, "Springtime for Hitler" THE NATION 518 (May 4, 1985):
The point of Reagan's impending trip to West Germany is to drive

home a single message to the network audience: in World War ITthe peoples of the free world, mostly Americans, British and Germans, fought
shoulder-to-shoulder against Soviet totalitarianism. Since there is no internationally recognized border in the President's mind between fantasy and
fact, this is the history in which he now believes and thus it is perfectly
natural for him to stand in silent appreciation over the bones of an S.S.
man, foe of Bolshevism and, like the Nicaraguan contras, the moral
equivalent of the Founding Fathers.
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that he has the future - (I have seen it before in the past from the
abolitionists to Christian Science) and it may be so. I can only say
that the reasoning seems to me inadequate and if it comes to force
I should put my [illegible] on the other side.65
This seems to me a classic example of modern, anti-socialist argument, directed here against the left-wing philosophy of Harold Laski,
revealing a long list of powerfully skeptical notions which can be utilized in debate against a broad range of utopian political views.
What is amusing, of course, is the way that Holmes used an orthodox variety of liberal "nihilism" or "moral skepticism" against the left,
whereas today, the ultimate inheritors of much of Holmes' skepticism,
the CLS teachers and scholars on the left, are criticized precisely for
being what Laski was not: more skeptical about value assumptions; i.e.,
more "nihilistic" like the healthy, analytical liberal. In other words, as
far as left-wing approaches to law and legal education in America are
concerned, it seems to be a case of "heads you lose, tails I win" where
the left is constantly cast as marginal, unprofessional, even unethical,
for being either nihilistic or not nihilistic enough, depending upon the
mood of orthodox intellectual bureaucrats, those to whom Paul Nizan
referred, only a few years after Holmes' letter to Laski, as "les Chiens
de garde".66

65.

HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES

AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935 at 948 (M.D.
66. See P. NIZAN, LES CHIENS DE GARDE

-

Howe, ed. 1953).
(1932) (reprinted -

not for nothing

by F. Maspero in 1965).
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